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Sirica: The New Federal Pleading Standard Ashcroft v. Iqbal

CASE COMMENTS
THE NEW FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARD
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
Allison Sirica*
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Javaid Iqbal, a
Muslim citizen of Pakistan, was arrested and detained in a maximum
security prison in the United States as a person of “high interest.”1 As a
detainee, Iqbal alleged he was subjected to severe physical and verbal
abuse, unnecessary and abusive strip and body-cavity searches, extended
detention in solitary confinement, and interference with his ability to
communicate with his counsel and to pray.2 Iqbal further claimed that he,
like thousands of other Arab Muslims, was subjected to these harsh
conditions solely because of his race, religion, or national origin and that
his continued detention stemmed from a discriminatory policy created by
high-level federal officials.3 As a result, Iqbal filed a claim4 in federal
district court against numerous federal officials including John Ashcroft,
former United States Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, alleging he was deprived of various
constitutional protections.5
In response, Mueller and Ashcroft moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to show their involvement in the unconstitutional conduct.6 The

* J.D. expected May 2010, University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A., B.S., 2007,
University of Florida. My deepest gratitude to all the editors, members and staff of the Florida Law
Review, but especially Monica Wilson, Jon Philipson, Lisa Caldwell, Angie Forder and Professor
Dennis Calfee for all of your insight, guidance and assistance during my tenure on the Review and
for your dedication and commitment to the Review. Also, a special thanks to the many friends I’ve
acquired during my three years in law school who have inspired me. This Comment is dedicated to
my family: Andy, Amber, Aryn and Clay.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2009).
2. Id. at 1944; see Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 2005), aff’d, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44; Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1.
4. Iqbal sought damages pursuant to the principles set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court
“recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged
to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947–48 (quoting
Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001)). In order to state a valid Bivens
claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show that the official adopted and implemented
policies for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin. Id. at
1948–49.
5. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1.
6. Ashcroft and Mueller sought dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, claiming that
“[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions enjoy qualified immunity and are
547
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district court denied the motion to dismiss reasoning the complaint alleged
facts on which Iqbal could be entitled to relief.7 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court reasoning that Iqbal’s pleading was
plausible and thus did not require factual allegations to amplify the claim.8
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court and HELD, in a
5-4 decision, that Iqbal’s complaint was insufficient to state a claim for
purposeful and unlawful discrimination.9
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires a pleader to set forth a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”10 The Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Conley v. Gibson11 emphasized that Rule 8 imposed
only a simplified notice pleading standard.12 In Conley, African American
railroad workers sued their union, alleging they were wrongfully
discharged when they were fired and replaced by white workers.13 The
union moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under
Rule 8.14 The Court held the complaint adequately set forth a claim upon
which relief could be granted under the Rule.15 In appraising the
sufficiency of the complaint, the Court applied the accepted rule that “a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”16 The Court reasoned that
since plaintiffs’ allegations, if proven to be true, would entitle the plaintiffs
to relief, the complaint was sufficient.17 In its reasoning, the Court noted
“the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”18 To the contrary, the
Rules require only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give

‘shielded from liability for civil damages’” so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established constitutional rights. Id. at *10.
7. Id. at *35.
8. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942, 1944; see Iqbal v. Hasty , 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
9. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
11. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
12. Id. at 47–48; see A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
402 (Thomson West 2007).
13. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.
14. Id. at 43.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. at 45–46; see Dabney D. Ware & Bradley R. Johnson, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.: Perverted Behavior Leads to a Perverse Ruling, 51 FLA. L. REV. 489, 499 (1999)
(noting that pursuant to Conley, “a court granting a motion to dismiss must find that there are no
facts which could be proven to support a finding of liability”).
17. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
18. Id. at 47.
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the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.”19
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,20 reassessed the
standard for evaluating the adequacy of pleadings under Rule 8, and
appeared to endorse a new paradigm that imposed a higher burden on
plaintiffs at the pleadings phase.21 The Court in Twombly concluded the
pleading standard under Rule 8 demands more than the notice-pleading
standard established in Conley.22 In Twombly, subscribers of various cable
and Internet services brought a class action against telephone and Internet
service providers alleging they engaged in a conspiracy in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.23 Specifically, the subscribers claimed the service
providers “engaged in parallel conduct” and “refrain[ed] from competing
against one another” in order to inhibit competition among each other.24
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held the plaintiffs’ action must be
dismissed under Rule 8 because the allegations did not give rise to a
plausible inference of conspiracy.25
According to Twombly, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”26 While the Court conceded that a complaint does not require
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must include the grounds of his
entitlement to relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”27 In other
words, plaintiffs need to show they are entitled to relief by pleading
allegations which plausibly suggest and are not merely consistent with
their claim.28 According to the Court, the plaintiffs’ allegation in Twombly
did not plausibly suggest the defendants engaged in a conspiracy29 because
the allegations amounted to parallel conduct that, although consistent with
an unlawful agreement, was more likely explained by free-market behavior
than by unlawful conspiracy.30 The Court required plaintiffs to provide
“further factual enhancement” in their pleadings in order to cross “the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”31
19. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
20. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
21. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442786##.
22. Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
23. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 553–54, 570.
26. Id. at 570.
27. Id. at 555.
28. Id. at 557.
29. Id. at 564–66.
30. Id. at 553–54; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567,
570).
31. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
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In the aftermath of Twombly, however, questions remained regarding
the applicability, implementation, and scope of the opinion.32 Specifically,
it was unclear whether the Court intended to confine the heightened
pleading standard to complex litigation, such as the antitrust claim in
Twombly, or whether the heightened pleading standard applied more
generally to all civil actions.33
The instant case clarified the uncertainty surrounding Twombly’s scope
and application.34 In its analysis, the Court in Iqbal applied the “[t]wo
working principles” that underlie its decision in Twombly and set forth a
new two-pronged approach to assess the sufficiency of a complaint.35
Furthermore, the Court unequivocally concluded that the Twombly
pleading standard applies in all federal civil actions.36
In the Court’s analysis, it first examined the “[t]wo working principles”
of Twombly: (1) a complaint must do more than make legal conclusions;
and (2) a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.37 First, while
courts must accept the truth of all factual allegations contained in a
complaint, the same tenant does not apply to legal conclusions.38
Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”39 While legal
conclusions may serve as a framework for a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations in order to be entitled to the assumption of
truth.40 Second, the complaint must show, not merely allege, the
32. Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG., Spring 2009, at 1;
Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Twombly Gets Iqbal-ed, TENN. B.J., July 2009, at 23, 23.
33. Posting of Ashby Jones to
Wall Street Journal Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/05/19/why-defense-lawyers-are-lovin-the-iqbal-decision/ (May 19,
2009, 13:07 EST). Twombly expressed concern about the “high cost of antitrust discovery to
defendants, in dismissing an antitrust complaint for failing to sufficiently plead allegations of
concerted action.” Larry Dougherty, Note, Does a Cartel Aim Expressly? Trusting Calder Personal
Jurisdiction When Antitrust Goes Global, 60 FLA. L. REV. 915, 932 n.119 (2008). As a result,
numerous lower courts determined the heightened pleading standard established in Twombly only
applied to “‘expensive, complicated litigation’ like the antitrust conspiracy litigation claims in
Twombly.”
Posting
of
Yuri
Mikulka
to
LawUpdates.com,
http://www.lawupdates.com/tips/entry/iashcroft_v._iqbal_i_raising_the_federal_pleading_standa
rd_for_plaintiffs_a/ (Aug. 18, 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.
2009); Filipek v. Krass, 576 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2008); In re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co.
KG Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2009)). Even when Iqbal came to the Second Circuit on
appeal, the court noted that Twombly created “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard
for assessing the adequacy of pleadings.” Iqbal, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009).
34. See Mikulka, supra note 33.
35. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50.
36. Id. at 1953.
37. Id. at 1949–50.
38. Id. at 1949.
39. Id. at 1949–50 (noting Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions”).
40. Id. at 1950.
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plausibility of the claim.41 In other words, “where the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’”42
Combining Twombly’s two working principles, the Court set forth a
new two-pronged approach for federal courts to apply in assessing the
sufficiency of a complaint.43 First, a court should identify pleadings that are
merely legal conclusions (therefore not entitled to the assumption of truth)
and those that are factual allegations.44 Next, after identifying the
complaint’s factual allegations, a court should assume their truth and then
determine whether they are plausible.45 According to the Court,
determining the plausibility of a complaint is a fact-specific task that
requires a court to use its “judicial experience” and “common sense.”46
In Iqbal, the Court applied the two-part test to evaluate the sufficiency
of the complaint.47 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action and should be dismissed.48 The
Court began its analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that
were not entitled to the truth presumption.49 Iqbal’s allegations that
Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed” to the discrimination, that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of
the policy, and that Mueller was “instrumental in adopting” the policy were
deemed conclusory.50 The Court compared these allegations to the “bare
assertions” plead in Twombly, reasoning they amounted to “nothing more
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional
discrimination claim.”51 Accordingly, the Court determined the conclusory
statements could not be assumed true.52
The Court then considered the factual allegations in Iqbal’s complaint
to determine their plausibility.53 In its analysis, the Court assumed true that
Mueller and Ashcroft “arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim
men” and approved the policy “of holding post-September 11th detainees
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
43. Id.; see Mintz Levin, Appellate Advisory: U.S. Supreme Court Addresses Pleading
Standard for Federal Civil Lawsuits in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, May 22, 2009, available at
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bdd79147-4847-4bfe-86e5-ae49025c7
2c5.
44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
45. Id.; see Mintz Levin, supra note 43.
46. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
47. Id. at 1951–52.
48. Id. at 1950–51.
49. Id. at 1951.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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in highly restrictive conditions of confinement.”54 The Court, however,
found these explanations did not plausibly establish Iqbal’s claim that he
was detained because of his race, religion, or national origin.55 Instead, the
Court focused on the “obvious alternative explanation” for Iqbal’s arrest
and confinement.56 The Court emphasized that the perpetrators of the
September 11th attacks were Arab Muslim hijackers who were members of
al Qaeda, and that al Qaeda is comprised of Arab Muslims and headed by
another Arab Muslim.57 Taking these factors into consideration, the Court
found it was a more plausible conclusion that the government focused on
Arab Muslims in the aftermath of September 11th because of their
“potential connections to those who committed [the] terrorist acts” rather
than because of outright discrimination.58 Accordingly, the Court reasoned
that as between the nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who
potentially had connections to terrorist attacks and the “invidious
discrimination” Iqbal claimed, “discrimination is not a plausible
conclusion.”59
The Court noted that even if the facts did amount to a plausible
inference that Iqbal’s arrest was the result of discrimination, Iqbal would
still not be entitled to relief.60 To prevail in his action, Iqbal would need to
allege facts plausibly showing that Ashcroft and Mueller purposefully
adopted a policy that discriminated against him solely because of his race,
religion, or national origin.61 The Court reasoned the complaint did not
contain any factual allegation to plausibly suggest Ashcroft’s and Muller’s
discriminatory states of mind.62 In fact, according to the Court, all the
complaint “plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s top law enforcement
officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the
suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.” Similar to its conclusion in
Twombly, the Court found Iqbal would need to do more “by way of factual
content to ‘nudg[e]’ his claim of purposeful discrimination ‘across the line
from conceivable to plausible.’”63
The decision in Iqbal has already been touted as one of the most
significant decisions impacting civil pleadings,64 creating broad and far54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1951–52.
60. Id. at 1952.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
64. See Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html (noting “Iqbal is
the most significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litigation in the federal
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reaching implications for both practitioners and parties to a federal civil
lawsuit.65 First, in attempting to clarify the Twombly standard and setting
forth a new two-pronged approach for evaluating pleadings,66 the Court
may have actually created more uncertainty on how courts should evaluate
the sufficiency of pleadings. Second, and most importantly, the present
case clarified that Twombly applies to all federal civil cases,67 thereby
expanding the heightened Twombly standard beyond complex or technical
cases.68
The clear tension between Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and
Justice Souter’s dissent illustrates that applying the two-prong test may be
more difficult for courts to undertake than it initially appears.69 As noted
above, the first prong of the test requires a court to identify pleadings that
are legal conclusions. At the outset, it is not entirely clear how a court
should distinguish between a complaint’s legal conclusions, which are not
entitled to the assumption of truth, and its legitimate factual allegations,
which are entitled to the assumption of truth.70 For example, in the instant
case, the majority and the dissent employed different standards to
distinguish between legal conclusions and factual allegations. While the
majority easily found that many of Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and
Mueller were too conclusory to be entitled to the assumption of truth,71 the
dissent disagreed and found the same allegations were factual and indeed
entitled to the truth presumption.72 What the majority classified as “bare
assertions” and a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” the dissent
characterized as factual allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief.73
Even focusing on the majority opinion alone, it is difficult to reconcile the
majority’s selection of certain allegations as conclusory with its treatment
of other allegations as nonconclusory.74 For example, the majority deemed
it nonconclusory, and took as true, that Mueller and Ashcroft “arrested and
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men” and approved the policy “of
holding post-September 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement.”75 Yet, the majority deemed it conclusory that Ashcroft and
Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed” to that
discrimination, that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the policy and
courts”). In fact, federal judges cited Iqbal more than 500 times in just two months following the
Court’s ruling. Id.
65. See Mintz Levin, supra note 43.
66. Id.; see Liptak, supra note 64.
67. Mintz Levin, supra note 43.
68. Id.; Rothman, supra note 32, at 1.
69. Mintz Levin, supra note 43.
70. Id.
71. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009); id. at 1959–60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1959–61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1960.
74. Id. at 1961.
75. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion); id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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that Mueller was “instrumental in adopting” the policy.76 Unfortunately,
the majority failed to provide reasoning of how to differentiate between the
two sets of allegations, only declaring that the latter set of allegations are
not entitled to the assumption of truth because of their “conclusory
nature.”77 As the dissent illustrates, “there is no principled basis for the
majority’s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller
to . . . [the] discrimination,” yet the majority’s acceptance of other
allegations that similarly link Ashcroft and Mueller to the discrimination.78
Another difficulty presented in applying the two-prong test is
determining whether a complaint’s factual allegations are plausible. As
noted above, once a court determines a pleading’s factual allegations, it
must determine whether the allegations are plausible. In the present case,
the majority failed to establish parameters on how to apply the plausibility
standard,79 instead leaving the plausibility determination to the “judicial
experience” and “common sense” of district courts.80 Justice Souter, who
authored the Twombly opinion, along with three other Justices, flatly
rejected the Iqbal majority’s approach to evaluating Twombly’s plausibility
standard.81 While the majority took into account the “more likely
explanations” and the “obvious alternative explanation” to determine the
plausibility of the claims,82 the dissent argued it is not a court’s place at the
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the allegations are probably
true.83 According to the dissent, a court must take all the allegations as true,
no matter how skeptical it may be, unless the allegations are “sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it.”84 As an illustration of claims that a
court could properly deem improbable, the dissent pointed to “claims about
little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in
time travel.”85 Despite the majority finding otherwise, the dissent argued
that Iqbal’s allegation that Muller and Ashcroft discriminated against him
on account of his race, religion, or national origin is not unrealistic or
nonsensical and, by itself, is sufficient to make a plausible claim.86
The present case certainly leaves questions regarding the proper
interpretation and application of Twombly’s plausibility standard when
76. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Mikulka, supra note 33.
80. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (majority opinion); see Caroline N. Mitchell, David S.
Rutkowski, & David L. Wallach, United States: Ascroft v. Iqbal: The New Federal Pledging
Standard, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEF, June 17, 2009, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?
articleid=81392.
81. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 1951 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1960.
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evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Not only is there a clear conflict
between the Court’s majority opinion and the four dissenting Justices over
what constitutes a plausible claim, but the Court creates greater uncertainty
by leaving the plausibility determination to the “judicial experience” and
“common sense” of district courts and permitting courts to look beyond the
complaint to the surrounding factual context to establish whether a claim
establishes plausibility.87 Many commentators have expressed concern that
this may result in highly subjective judgments and inconsistent results
among trial courts.88 Some have claimed the instant case enables district
judges to “dismiss cases based on their own subjective notions of what is
probably true,” which will inevitably create disparate and irreconcilable
results.89 At least one legal commentator claims, however, that the judicial
discretion the Court imposed on lower courts may not be as significant as
many commentators believe.90
Undoubtedly, the biggest impact the present case will have on
practitioners and parties to federal civil lawsuits is its expansion of the
Twombly pleading standard to all federal civil cases. Prior to Iqbal, some
courts were reluctant to expand Twombly to all civil suits. Iqbal, however,
unequivocally “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’” 91
suppressing any doubt that the Twombly standard should be limited to
technical, complex cases.92 As a result, the instant case will inevitably
increase the number of motions to dismiss defendants will file, as well as
increase the number of such motions that are granted.93 Defendants in all
civil federal cases can now use Twombly’s plausibility standard as a
powerful tool to obtain an early dismissal of a claim.94 By strengthening
the “factual particularity that a plaintiff must allege in [all civil]
87. Id. at 1950–51 (majority opinion); see Mitchell et al., supra note 80.
88. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51; see Liptak, supra note 64; Mitchell et al., supra note 80;
Rothman, supra note 32, at 1; Posting of Jaya Ramji-Nogales to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/08/re-reading-iqbal-a-new-take-on-the-12b6wars.html (Aug. 4, 2009 08:28 EST); see also Jason Barlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven
and Self-Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 73, 94–
97 (2009).
89. Rothman, supra note 32, at 1–2.
90. See Steinman, supra note 21. According to Steinman, although Iqbal recognizes a judge’s
power to disregard “conclusory” allegations at the pleadings phase, this does not necessarily
constitute a drastic shift from notice pleading. Before Iqbal, the notice-pleading regime gave judges
some power to disregard allegations in a complaint. The critical question for judges was whether
the pleading constituted “fair notice.” Post-Iqbal, judges must still determine whether certain
allegations in a pleading should be disregarded if they determine the allegations are “conclusory.”
Therefore, even after Iqbal, judges still must answer the crucial question of what a complaint must
contain in order for an allegation to be accepted as true.
91. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555–56 (2007)).
92. Rothman, supra note 32, at 1; Mintz Levin, supra note 43; Mitchell et al., supra note 80.
93. See Mikulka, supra note 33; Mitchell et al., supra note 80.
94. Mikulka, supra note 33.
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complaint[s],”95 and in effect creating a universal heightened pleading
standard under Rule 8, the Court makes it easier for defendants to dispose
of a suit early in the litigation process.96 Indeed, the ruling makes it more
difficult for plaintiffs to coerce settlements from defendants who wish to
avoid the expensive costs of discovery.97
By the same token, the decision may make it harder for plaintiffs to get
past the pleading stage;98 thereby potentially quashing meritorious claims
and “threaten[ing] the entire federal system of notice pleading.”99 The
present case may even completely prevent legitimate claims from
proceeding to discovery because plaintiffs may not have enough
information at the pleading stage to plead sufficient plausible facts.100
Whereas prior to Iqbal, plaintiffs could plead a general description of their
claim and rely on the pre-trial process to uncover supporting evidence, post
Iqbal, this option is no longer available.101 Instead, many plaintiffs will find
themselves in a pleading dilemma.102 That is, plaintiffs will be required to
include certain facts in their pleadings that can only be obtained through
discovery.103 As a result, “potentially meritorious cases [may be] deterred
or dismissed with the plaintiff never having had a chance to fully explore
the evidence in support of the claim.”104 Particularly in cases such as the
present case, which involve high-level governmental officials who “are
likely to keep the details of their policies hidden from the public,” it may
be difficult to obtain the evidence necessary to plead enough plausible
facts.105 For instance, in Iqbal, it is not clear how Iqbal could obtain

95. Mintz Levin, supra note 43.
96. Jones, supra note 33.
97. Mintz Levin, supra note 43; David G. Savage, Narrowing the Courthouse Door, A.B.A.
J., July 2009, at 22; see Steinman, supra note 21 (noting “[i]f pleading standards are too lenient,
plaintiffs without meritorious claims could force innocent defendants to endure the costs of
discovery and, perhaps, extract a nuisance settlement from a defendant who would rather pay the
plaintiff to make the case go away”).
98. Liptak, supra note 64.
99. Tom Kurland & Janelle Menendez, Supreme Court Previews: Ashcroft, Former Att’y
Gen. v. Iqbal (07-1015) Appealed from the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (June 14,
2007) Oral Argument: Dec. 10, 2008, Fed. Law. Feb. 2009, at 52, 52–53. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 FED.
L. 52, 52 (2009).
100. Rothman, supra note 32, at 1; Ramji-Nogales, supra note 88.
101. Kurland & Menendez, supra note 99, at 52; Mitchell et al., supra note 80.
102. Savage, supra note 97, at 22.
103. Id.
104. Posting of Howard Wasserman to PrawfsBlawgl, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
blawg/2009/06/discovery-defaults-and-iqbal.html (June 2, 2009, 06:38 EST); see Steinman, supra
note 21 06:38 EST); see Steinman, supra note 21 (noting “by increasing the federal pleading
standards, meritorious cases could be dismissed at the pleadings phase without plaintiffs having the
opportunity to engage in pretrial discovery that, if permitted, would confirm the case’s merit”).
105. Kurland & Menendez, supra note 99, at 52.
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evidence that showed Ashcroft and Mueller discriminated against him
without being able to question the officials and inspect documents.106
Without a doubt, the present case drastically changes the landscape for
federal pleading standards and signifies a new era for pleading standards in
every civil case in federal court.107 By extending the heightened pleading
standard to all civil actions, the case has broad, far-reaching implications
for both practitioners and parties to a civil lawsuit in federal court.108
Unfortunately, however, the Court in Iqbal fails to provide district courts
with an adequate framework for evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings.109
Consequently, district courts are left to wrestle with how to properly
interpret and apply the new pleading standard, which will likely result in
inconsistent outcomes based on the subjective notions of what trial judges
believe is plausible.110
In order to help limit the inconsistent results among district courts
resulting from differing judicial interpretations of Iqbal’s new pleading
standard, federal courts should interpret Iqbal as being consistent with
Rule 8’s liberal notice pleading regime.111 Accordingly, in interpreting and
applying the first-prong of the Iqbal pleading standard, courts should only
dismiss claims which “merely parrot the statutory language of the claims
that they are pleading.”112 On the other hand, courts should accept those
pleadings which contain specific facts to support the plaintiff’s legal
claims.113 Anything other than “abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements” should be entitled to the
assumption of truth.114 In interpreting and applying the second prong of the
Iqbal pleading standard, courts should only deny those factual allegations
which are “so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient
notice to defendants of the plaintiff’s claim.”115 While employing such a
framework will not completely eliminate the judicial subjectivity Iqbal
created, such an approach will allow courts to focus more on the merits of
the claim “rather than on the technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of
court.”116

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Savage, supra note 97, at 22.
Rothman, supra note 32, at 2; Steinman, supra note 21.
Rothman, supra note 32, at 2.
Steinman, supra note 21.
See Rothman, supra note 32, at 2; Mitchell et al., supra note 80.
See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580–82 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 581.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 580 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
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